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Abstract
Poaching externality, from job-to-job turnovers, which implies planer
should allocate less resources on costly job creations. However, these
search efforts increase competitions among employers, which could in-
ternalize the externality. Whereas the congestion externality requires
unit-elastic matching function.
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The seminal work by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) (hence B&M) as-
sumed an exogenous contacting rate, which causes deficiency in understand-
ing of the labour demand. Following Mortensen (2000), the on-the-job
search model of B&M is integrated into the matching framework of Pissarides
(2000). By allowing different search efforts for employed and unemployed
workers, this paper investigates welfare implications of job search.
Mortensen (2000) assumed the same contracting rate for both on-the-
job search and off-the-job search. Hence, the cost of employment is zero,
and the reservation wage of the unemployed is equal to the value of leisure,
thus it is independent from other parameters, such as market tightness and
wage-offer distribution. Accordingly, Mortensen (2010) argues that dispersed
wage equilibrium is more efficient than the degenerate equilibrium (Diamond
1971). To understand the welfare consequences of job-to-job transactions in
general, it is important to understand how these turnovers influence the
wage-setting strategy of firms.
Beyond Mortensen (2000), modelling the search problem with different
contacting rates allows to split different types of externality which arise in a
decentralized market. Specifically, we show that there are two types of exter-
nality in the market, congestion externality and poaching externality, with
the former causing welfare loss to vacant jobs, and the latter to the filled ones.
The poaching externality, i.e. the reason for inefficiency in Mortensen (2000),
drives the socially efficient level of vacancies down, but it is internalized in
the market, through competition among wage setting firms. Specifically, we
show that a higher job-to-job turnover leads to a higher supremum of distri-
bution of wage offers and a stronger employment effect. However, constrained
efficiency requires the matching function to be unit elastic to internalize the
crowding out externality. Hence, the argument in Mortensen (2010) is not
necessarily valid in general. Indeed, on-the-job search drives the numbers
of vacancies down in a market equilibrium; however, the socially efficient
number of firms is also lower, due to the poaching externality. It is unclear
whether a market with dispersed wage is more efficient than one with a single
monopoly wage.
1 The Model
Time is continuous. Ex-ante homogeneous firms and workers are infinitely
lived, risk neutral, and discount with r. The measure of workers is 1, of
which u are unemployed. The measure of employers is determined through
free entry. The output of a filled job, y, and the vacancy cost, c are constant.
Workers search with effort s. However, the unemployed search with s = 1
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but the employed with 0 < s < 1.1There is no searching cost. m is the number
of aggregate contacts,
m = m(v, u+ s(1− u))
which satisfies the standard assumptions.2 θ = v/(u+ s(1− u)) denotes the
effective market tightness. The average job offer arrival rate for an unem-
ployed worker is
λ =
m(v, u+ s(1− u))
u+ s(1− u) ≡ λ(θ)
The offer arrival rate of an employed worker is instead sλ(θ). The contact
rate of a vacancy is q(θ) = λ(θ)
θ
.
2 Search Equilibrium
Following B&M, a job offer is a random draw from a wage offer distribution
F on a support of [w,w]. Let JU denote the present value for an unemployed
worker, and JE(w) for the employed at wage w. The stead-state implies that
rJU = b+ λ(θ)
∫ w
w
max
{
JE(w′)− JU , 0} dF (w′) (1)
(r + δ)JE(w) = w + sλ(θ)
∫ w
w
max
{
JE(w′)− JE(w), 0} dF (w′) + δJU (2)
An unemployed worker obtains unemployment benefits b and receives wage
offers at a rate λ(θ), in which case he accepts it if and only if the capital gains
are non-negative. An employed worker earns a flow income w, and the job
ends at rate δ, leaving the worker unemployed; the worker may get another
offer at rate sλ(θ), leading to another job if capital gains are non-negative.
Hence, there is a common reservation strategy for all the unemployed, such
that JE(R) = JU , and w = R in any equilibrium.
LetG(w) represents the proportion of workers receiving a wage not greater
than w. JV is the present-discounted value of a vacancy, and JF (w) the value
of a filled job which pays a wage w. Specifically,
rJV = q(θ) max
w≥R
{
u+ s(1− u)G(w)
u+ (1− u)s [J
F (w)− JV ]
}
− c (3)
The wage offer w ≥ R will be accepted if the worker is unemployed, with
a probability u/(u + s(1− u)) or, if he is employed with a wage not greater
1For empirical evidence, see Christensen et al. 2005, Rosholm and Svarer 2004.
2For details of aggregate matching function see Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001).
3
than w, with a probability s(1− u)G(w)/(u+ s(1− u)). Similar arguments
define JF (w),
JF (w) =
y − w
r + sλ(θ)[1− F (w)] + δ (4)
With r → 0, the unique solution to the search-and-matching equilibrium
is defined recursively through the conditions of reservation wage,
R =
[sλ(θ) + δ]2b+ (1− s)sλ2(θ)y
[sλ(θ) + δ]2 + (1− s)sλ2(θ) (RC)
the job creation condition,
c
q(θ)
=
δ(y − b)
[sλ(θ) + δ]2 + (1− s)sλ2(θ) (JC)
and the steady-state unemployment,
u =
δ
δ + λ(θ)
. (SS)
3 Efficiency
Subject to the matching constraint, a utilitarian planner chooses job vacancy
level and unemployment to maximize the income flow net of recruiting costs:
max
u,v
{(1− u)y + ub− cv} (5)
s.t. δ(1− u) = λ(θ)[1− F (R)]u
By virtues of θ = v/[u+ s(1− u)] and F (R) = 0, the unique solution to the
planner’s problem, θ∗, is such that
c =
(y − b)λ′(θ∗)δ
[δ + λ(θ∗)][δ + sλ(θ∗)]− θ∗(1− s)δλ′(θ∗) (6)
To derive the relationship between efficient level of job creation and efforts of
on-the-job search by implicitly differentiating the above first-order condition,
dθ
ds
=
λ′(θ)[λ(θ)δ + λ(θ)2 + θδλ′(θ)]
(δ + λ(θ))[λ2(θ)δ + λ2(θ)sλ(θ)− 2sλ′(θ)2] < 0 (7)
As λ(.) is strictly concave the above expression is negative. This finding
leads the following result:
Proposition 1. A higher on-the-job search effort implies a lower efficient
number of job vacancies to be created due to poaching externality.
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Comparing with Pissarides (2000), whereas s = 0, on-the-job search cre-
ates extra costs, i.e. the poaching externality, for the planner. As the match-
ing is a stochastic rationing, if a vacancy is filled by the unemployed, other
unfilled jobs are worse off, but the other unemployed are better off (thick
market effect). On the other hand, a job, terminated due to the loss of its
employee to another firm which pays higher wages, turns into a vacancy.
Opposed to the standard model, these vacancies do not leave the market.
Henceforth, the firm poached by other employers has to bear a vacancy and
start paying c. Accordingly, by recruiting an employed worker, a firm exer-
cises the poaching externality, thus rendering the filled firms worse off, but
leaving unemployed welfare unchanged. In short, filled firms suffer losses due
to the workers could transfer from job to job, i.e. the poaching externality.
The planner values this negative externality in a sense that, as job creation
is costly, firms recruiting from amongst the unemployed drive the number of
vacancies down. Instead, if a vacancy is filled through poaching, the aggre-
gate number of vacancies in the market is unchanged. In other words, for
vacant jobs, the average length of search is longer with job-to-job turnovers.
Consequently, the higher the on-the-job search effort, the stronger this exter-
nality, and the higher efficiency loss to allocate resources to create vacancies,
i.e. a cost to the planner, hence the lower θ∗.
However, by comparing with the (JC) condition, the following theorem
argues that the poaching externality is internalised. Instead, the constrained
efficiency requires special properties of the matching function
Theorem 1. The decentralized labour market is constrained efficient if and
only if the matching function is unit-elastic.
Proposition 1 is the Hosios (1990) condition in terms of wage posting.
As a monopsony wage setter, a firm has full bargaining power. According to
the Hosios condition, the search equilibrium is socially efficient if, and only
if, the matching function is homogeneous of degree one and the firm’s share
of surplus β equals the elasticity of the matching function in regards to the
vacancy. In a wage posting game β = 1, hence the Hosios condition implies
theorem 1.
The elasticity of matching function, η(θ),3 measures the relative effec-
tiveness of the firms in making contacts. Hence, 1 − η(θ) measures conges-
tion externality that marginal firms caused to other firms. Following the
3Formally, the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancy can be derived
η(θ) =
∂m(u+ s(1− u), v)/∂v
m(u+ s(1− u), v)/v =
v
u+s(1−u)mv(u+ s(1− u), v)
m(u+s(1−u),v)
u+s(1−u)
=
θλ′(θ)
λ(θ)
.
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Hosios condition, constrained efficiency requires that the agents who cause
congestion externality are punished by grant with a lower bargaining power.
Following this principle, wage posting firms have full bargaining power, ac-
cordingly the decentralized market is constrained efficiency if and only if the
firm’s congestion externality is neutralised, i.e. the matching function is unit-
elastic. As an implication of the theorem, it is straightforward to see that if
η(θ) < 1, for example, a Cobb-Douglas function, there will be excess entry of
vacancies in a decentralized market, due to the congestion externality, that
is not been taken into consideration.
Constrained efficiency only concerns of crowding out externality as s may
“internalize” poaching externality through two mechanisms: first, it increases
the supremum of wage-offer distribution F ; second, it boosts employment ef-
fects. As workers could switch to a better job with a higher wage, firms have
an incentive to raise their no-quitting premium, so that the supremum of F
rises, i.e. ∂w/∂s > 0.4 The employment effect states that the worker’s wage
distribution first-order stochastically dominates the wage offer distribution,
i.e. G(w) < F (w). For any wage w, G(w) decreases in s, and this implies
that a higher on-the-job search effort boosts the employment effect and shifts
G down, so that there will be more workers employed with a higher wage. In
short, competition among firms offsets the poaching externality. Following
theorem 1, the decentralized market is constrained efficient if, and only if,
the congestion externality is “internalized”.
4 Conclusion
Market frictions lead to job search, which in turn results in equilibrium wage
dispersion. On the other hand, search incurs poaching externality and con-
gestion externality. Due to competitions among employers, poaching ex-
ternality from job-to-job turnovers is internalized in the market. Hence, a
decentralized market is efficient if and only if the matching is unit-elastic.
4One can derive this relation by solving equilibrium reservation wage and showing
∂w
∂s
=
(y − b)λ(θ)δ2(2δ + λ(θ))
[2sλ(θ)δ + δ2 + sλ2(θ)]2
> 0.
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